Ethics, emotions and culture: Respecting moral diversity
The experience of being involved in the dying process of another person has an impact on almost every human being. Whether this involvement is that of a professional care giver, a relative or a volunteer seems of secondary importance. The direct confrontation with a dying process is an experience that confronts us with the finitude and irreversibility of human existence. In most people, this evokes a multitude of emotions and thoughts, ranging from feelings of guilt or responsibility to sadness, anger or sometimes even joy. Emotions are important human reactions to situations, containing knowledge and appraisals of reality, and having an intelligence of their own. 1 An important part of our emotional responses to a dying process is related to the things we value in our lives. They are connected with our worldview, our ideas, and experiences of what makes life meaningful. 2 A mother of four should not die of breast cancer in her mid 40s, for this runs contrary to whatever possible order of justice in the world. A beloved father in a vegetative state should not die a horrible death when feedings tubes are withdrawn, even when he had always stated that he would not have wanted to live in this condition. Facing the death of other people, we are confronted with our deepest convictions of what makes sense and what does not.
Emotions
Although emotions play an important role in our daily lives, their role in ethics has been much debated for more than 2000 years in the Western World. Both fathers of Western philosophy, Plato and Aristotle, already differed in their view on the role of emotions in ethics. Where Plato considered emotions unwelcome distractions that clouded the clear reasoning indispensable to making good ethical decisions, Aristotle was convinced that as rational animals we should rather educate our emotional responses into virtuous responses than trying to neglect or suppress them. Different views on what a human being essentially is lead to different views on how to move forward in ethics.
The dispute between these two ancient Greek philosophers has been continued in a great variety of ways over the centuries. And in a way, the debate seems to be still going on, given the many ethical theories that have been developed during the centuries and have left us with an ethical landscape that is as diverse as the many cultures we find around the world.
In ethical discussions in palliative care, however, there seems to be one important point of agreement among the participants: that ethical argumentations cannot rest on reasoning alone, but should be grounded in empirical research. Being in tune with the so called 'empirical turn in bioethics' that began some 20 years ago, palliative care ethics is an empirically informed ethics. 3 But that raises new questions. Because what then is the role of emotions in ethical decision making in the face of suffering and dying? Does what is morally good, always necessarily 'feel good'? And can the abhorrence of family members be sufficient reason to reject a decision or practice as morally wrong?
Interpretation
The article of Kitzinger and Kitzinger in this issue shows how important it is to understand and respect emotions of families of patients in order to be able to give morally good care. For whatever may be the right thing to do according to the recommendations of clinical guidelines, the dying process is a social process and palliative care focuses on both patients and families. The case of withdrawing a feeding tube discussed in this article is an interesting case for a number of reasons. First, because it confronts us with the relation between emotions and interpretation. Some family members experienced the process of dying after tube withdrawal as a horrible death. Irrespective of whether this is true or not, this fact asks for a conversation with and good accompaniment of the family members. If this does not happen, the studies show, a traumatic experience can still distress a family member 16 years later.
Second, because the case of tube withdrawal shows that family members have a hard time in living with complex and sometimes contradicting emotions and ethical convictions. In advance fighting for tube withdrawal, next to remaining ethical objections and anxiousness about the subsequent dying process; in retrospective being relieved of having witnessed a good death, despite ethical objections that remained. Inner struggles like these show how much ethics is related to meaning making and spirituality. Would a good conversation, in which there had been room to explore the many conflicting meanings of the dying process, have been helpful to develop more inner space?
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This question becomes even more pressing when one considers the fact that most patients speak about a 'burden of witness' next to the experience that it concerned a surprisingly 'good' death.
It is here that a third important element comes in: the role of culture in ethical issues. The authors report that although the National Clinical Guidelines recommend otherwise, the default option in England and Wales is to continue tube feeding to persons in a permanent vegetative or minimally conscious state indefinitely. This seems to be the norm across many European countries. What holds people from following the National Clinical Guidelines when not a shared set of cultural ideas, often implicit and not always well reflected? And how do we inform and educate a culture when even those who are directly involved discover that they could not have predicted what the actual experience of witnessing the dying process would do to them?
The big question of empirically informed ethics is what role the experience of people should be given in determining the moral goodness of a practice. 4 As we are all part of specific cultural contexts and practices, we are all culturally determined in our sensitivity to the boundaries of what is morally acceptable and not. And often during our professional lives, we come to insights and convictions that are different than when we began our career. Moral development or moral decay? Is there any objective ethical ground or foundation to determine this? I think not.
Culture and interpretation
The reason why it seems impossible to find such an objective ethical foundation is because ethics starts with an appreciation and interpretation of reality. How difficult this is, is shown by the paper of Schildmann et al. In a retrospective cohort study of 192 medical records in the South of Germany, it was found that there was no consistent pattern regarding labelling the use of continuous sedatives as '(palliative) sedation'. The reason for this is that caregivers label different practices as palliative sedation, despite the definitions and guidelines that are available. The authors plea for multicentre qualitative and quantitative research and conceptual analysis of sedation practices and their labelling in order to develop good guidelines for practitioners and provide researchers for comparable data. From an ethical perspective, it would be interesting to understand to what extent the differences in labelling are related to individual or cultural moral values. Dependent on one's beliefs and convictions about life and death, one might be labelling one's actions in one way or another. However much we might develop consensus-based definitions of different types of sedation and their differentiation from 'symptom control with secondary sedation', this will not lead to a uniformity in the ethical evaluation in palliative care. Why is this? Because we have various incompatible ethical theories and the great-grandchildren of Plato will continue disagreeing with those of Aristotle. What is necessary in science, agreement about definitions and standards, is impossible in ethics. The reason for this is that ethics is a cultural product based on a shared legacy and lived experience reflected in a particular language, history, and traditions. 5 It is this cultural diversity which helps us in appreciating the infinite richness of human experiences and interpretations of life and death across the globe. Respecting this cultural diversity, also as it is articulated in its ethical form, is not an easy task, especially when it touches upon our deepest felt emotions and convictions. The dying process of a human being may confront us with the foundation of our own moral standards. That makes the provision of palliative care a deeply ethical practice. It may also be an exercise in respect of moral diversity. Sometimes even an exercise of tolerance.
